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BE ALL YOU CAN BE (WITHOUT THE
PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION)
Keith M. Harrison*
INTRODUCTION
[W]hy is the Constitution of the United States so exceptional?
Well, the difference is so small that it almost escapes you-
but it's so great it tells you the whole story in just three words:
We the people. In those other constitutions, the Government
tells the people of those countries what they're allowed to do.
In our Constitution, we the people tell the Government what it
can do, and it can only do those things listed in that document
and no others. Virtually every other revolution in history has
just exchanged one set of rulers for another set of rulers. Our
revolution is the first to say the people are the masters and
government is their servant .. [B]ecause here in America, we
the people are in charge.
Just three words: We the people-Those are the kids on
Christmas day looking out from a frozen sentry post on the 38th
Parallel in Korea or aboard an aircraft carrier in the Mediterra-
nean. A million miles from home but doing their duty.'
Despite the generous inclusion by President Reagan of the many
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in the concept of "the people" of
this republic, it is not altogether dear whether one whose status has
changed from ordinary "citizen" to "a member of the armed forces" can
legitimately claim any of the constitutional protections of citizen-
ship until he or she is no longer a member of the armed forces. In the
course of this nation's history the Supreme Court has denied some
or all of the protection of the Constitution to many groups of
people, including African-Americans, 2  women,3  Native Ameri-
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver. B.A. Saint John's College, 1977;
J.D. University of Chicago, 1981. The author was of counsel to the American Civil
Liberties Union in an amicus curiae brief filed in support of the petitioner in Solorio
v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987), a central case discussed in this article. How-
ever, the views expressed by the author herein are not necessarily shared by the
American Civil Liberties Union or Mr. Solorio. Mr. Harrison would like to thank
Karen M. Anderson, Esquire, for her support, encouragement, and advice during
the preparation of this article.
1. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PuB. PAPERS
OF TME PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, RONALD REAGAN 1987 60 (Jan. 27, 1987).
2. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857) ("[People of African descent] had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect... [and they] might justly and
lawfully be reduced to slavery....").
3. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) ("[H]istory discloses that woman has always
222* HARVARD BLACKLETTER JOURNAL U VOL. 8, 1991
cans, 4 Americans of Japanese ancestry,5 aliens, 6 and more recently to
members of the armed forces.
Just six months after President Reagan spoke the words quoted
above, the Court overturned a precedent of nearly twenty years and
held, in Solorio v. United States,7 that a member of the armed forces could
be tried by a court-martial for virtually any offense without regard to
the impact the alleged offense may, or may not, have had on the military
or the ability of that service member to function in the military. While
the decision may seem fairly innocuous at first blush, this article will
demonstrate that the judicial mindset demonstrated by the Solorio hold-
ing is ill-conceived from the point of view of the soldier8 who is the
accused at a court-martial. Moreover, the Supreme Court has demon-
strated a judicial myopia which threatens the very form of government
conceived by the framers of the Constitution. The decision perpetuates
legal class distinctions which should not play a part in a democracy or
in the administration of criminal justice and it paves the way for the
creation of a "warrior class" with fewer rights in criminal proceedings.
The Solorio decision should be of particular concern to members of
the African-American, Hispanic, Native American, and poor communi-
ties in this country. This nation's military forces are now composed
exclusively of volunteers. However, because of the high levels of un-
employment which plague the youth of many minority communities, a
strong argument can be made that we still have a poor person's draft.
As a result, African-Americans, who make up only 12% of the American
population, represent over 20%9 of the nation's Armed Forces. Of the
been dependent upon man. He established his control at the outset by superior
physical strength .... It is impossible to close one's eyes to the fact that she still
looks to her brother and depends upon him.") See also Minor v. Happersett, 88
U.S. 162 (1875) (holding that although women have always been citizens under the
Constitution, they are not the citizens whom the framers intended to be enfran-
chised).
4. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884) (despite the passage of the fourteenth
amendment, Native Americans who were born in the United States "were never
deemed citizens of the United States, except under explicit provisions of treaty or
statute . . . declaring ... [individuals or tribes] to be ... [or eligible to] become
citizens... [with] satisfactory proof of fitness for civilized life.... ").
5. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217 (1944) ("[W]e are unable to conclude
that it was beyond the war power of Congress and the Executive to exclude those
of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area. .. ").
6. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, (also known as The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130
U.S. 581, 603 (1889) ("These [Chinese] laborers are not citizens of the United States;
they are aliens. That the government of the United States ... can exclude aliens
from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy.
Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent
nation.").
7. 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
8. Throughout this article I will use the term soldier interchangeably with the term
"member of the armed forces." However, the reader should keep in mind the fact
that the laws relating to the military that I discuss herein are equally applicable to
the officers and enlisted personnel of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard,
and Air Force. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 101(4) and 802(a)(1).
9. Lynne Duke, Gen. Powell Notes Military Enlistment Remains Matter of Individual Choice,
Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 1990, at A30.
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troops recently deployed to the Persian Gulf during operation Desert
Storm 104,000, or 25%, were Black and nearly 30% of the ground troops
were Black. 10 The inequity of these numbers seems more pronounced
when we remember that in the same year of the deployment of military
forces to the Persian Gulf the President vetoed a major piece of civil
rights legislation." Later, while troops were at risk in the Gulf, the Vice
President and the Secretary of the Air Force played golf at an all-white
country club. 12
Even without the immediate threat of loss of life, poor and minority
communities should still be alarmed at the recent extension of court-
martial jurisdiction. The history of military law reveals that the court-
martial is more a tool of military discipline than of democratic justice.
The American court-martial has made great advances since the founding
of the nation. However, it falls short of what we demand of civilian
courts when they deprive a person of liberty. Through Solorio, the
Supreme Court has raised the status of courts-martial to that of a civilian
criminal trial. In doing so, it has undermined the significance of civilian
courts in the lives of soldiers. Members of the armed forces have less
reason to believe that civilian courts have any power to protect their
rights. Indeed they may question whether military authority is at all
subject to civilian rule. As long as social conditions persist which make
enlistment in the military the most attractive prospect for a class of
young men and women, the Solorio decision creates a separate system
of criminal discipline to which this class is peculiarly susceptible.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN MILITARY LAW AND THE
EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF SERVICE-CONNECTION
The Constitution confers certain powers upon the Congress and
others on the President. The exact relationship between the two political
branches in executing their national defense responsibilities has been
the subject of frequent debate.' 3 The Constitution gives Congress the
10. Isabel Wilkerson, War in the Gulf. The Troops, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1991, at Al, col.
2. According to Department of Defense data, as of January 3, 1991, the Army
troops deployed in Operation Desert Storm were composed of 29.8% African-
Americans, 4.2% Hispanic Americans, 1.0% Asian Americans, and 0.5% Native
Americans. See also Taylor, Volunteer Army Facing First Big Test in Gulf War, San
Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 9, 1991, at All.
11. President Bush vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1990 on October 22, 1990. 136 CONG.
REc. S16418 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (Veto Message of Pres. Bush).
12. Quayle Plays Golf at All-White Club, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1990, at A9, col. 1. The
Vice President's spokesperson said that he was unaware of the controversy sur-
rounding the club. After being informed by the press, the Vice President left the
country club. However, Secretary Donald B. Rice, a member of the dub, continued
to play.
13. In one of the Supreme Court's earliest examinations of the relationship of the war
powers of the Congress and the executive branch, it observed that, while the
Congress has the power to declare war:
If a war be made by a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but
bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to
accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority. And
224 u HARVARD BLACKLETrER JOURNAL U VOL. 8, 1991
power and the responsibility: to define and punish offenses against the
law of nations,14 to declare war,'" to raise and support armies,16 to
provide for and maintain a navy,' 7 to make rules for the government
and regulation of the land and naval forces,' to provide for calling forth
the militia,' 9 to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the
militia, 20 and to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to
execute these powers.2'
The Constitution designates the President as the Commander in
Chief of the armed forces of the United States 22 and, when called into
the actual service of the United States, the militia of the several states.23
With the advice and consent of the Senate, the President is authorized
to appoint the officers of the federal armed forces. 24 However, through
appropriate legislation, this authority may be vested in the President
alone or the head of the responsible cabinet office.25
The Constitution gives the Judiciary no specific authority over the
military. However, the courts have decided cases on several occasions
which involve the interpretation of the limits of the war powers of the
political branches.26
The first legislation of the Continental Congress, which extensively
dealt with discipline in the military, was passed in 177527 when the
Continental Army was composed of a relatively small number of vol-
unteers.2 8 Recognizing the need for a means of disciplining the troops
whether the hostile party be a foreign invader, or States'organized in rebellion,
it is none the less a war.
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863). See also Abraham Sofaer, The War Powers Reso-
lution; Fifteen Years Later, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 317 (1989).
14. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 11.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
18. U.S. CONST. art. , § 8, cd. 14. This also includes the Army, Navy, Marine Corps,
Air Force, and Coast Guard. See 10 U.S.C. § 801(8) (1988).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 18.
22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, ci. 1.
23. Id.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
25. Id. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 593(a).
26. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (the President's
powers as Commander in Chief do not authorize the seizure of private property
without statutory authority); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (Congress does not
have the authority to strip a native-born citizen of United States citizenship as
punishment for deserting the armed forces in a time of war).
27. II JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1775, 111, June 30, 1775 (1905).
28. On June 15th [1775] George Washington was appointed "to command all the
Continental Forces;" on July 4, 1775, it was announced in general orders that
the "troops of the United Provinces of North America" were taken over by
Congress. The army then numbered not more than 14,500 men, including
perhaps the newly organized train of artillery which had been authorized in
April by the [Provincial Congress of Massachusetts]. There existed also a
coastguard which had been raised to defend the sea-board....
CHARLEsKNowLEs BOLTON, THE PRVATE SOLDIER UNDER WASHINGTON 19 (1902)
(reprinted 1964) (footnotes omitted).
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swiftly, and without the required formalities of civilian justice, the Con-
tinental Congress adopted, without significant change, the existing Brit-
ish Articles of War29 as the American Articles of War.30 The British
Articles of War, in turn, can be traced to the seventeenth-century military
codes of King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden.31 Both the British Articles
of War and the military codes of King Gustavus Adolphus were rules
that were adopted in societies having a strict caste system. They were
rooted in the political theories of feudal states and courts of chivalry.
The system of ranking and regulating people in the military only served
to reinforce the existing social strata which were based on wealth and
inherited assignments of nobility.32
The American Articles of War were significantly amended on several
occasions through 1948. 33 However, none of these amendments sub-
stantially varied from the foundation laid by the 1775 Articles, which
were not substantially different in nature from the military codes pro-
mulgated by Gustavus Adolphus in 1621.
While the Continental Congress adopted substantial portions of the
British Articles of War, the Congress' incorporation was not done in total
blindness and without significant exception. The Continental Congress
recognized that its soldiers were also citizens, and therefore, they too
were a part of the movement toward greater independence then under-
29. British Articles of War of 1765, reprinted in WILLIAM WmNTHROP, MiLITARY LAW AND
PRECEDENTS, app. VII, 931 (3d. ed. 1979).
30. The American Articles of War of 1775, reprinted id., app. IX, at 953.
31. Gustavus Adolphus' fame as perhaps the greatest leader in the revolutionary
development of warfare in the seventeenth century overshadows his more
permanent contribution to the development of modem armies, that of a dis-
ciplinary code which gives meaning to command and control. Gustavus' Ar-
ticles of War of 1621 "inaugurated the history of modem military justice."
They, in effect, formalized recognition of the "four moral virtues necessary to
any army: order, discipline, obedience, and justice." Gustavus Adolphus was
not only a great soldier, but a true military genius whose Articles of War of
1621 are the foundation upon which is structured military justice today.
Norman Cooper, Gustavus Adolphus and Military Justice, 92 MiL. L. REv. 129, 137
(1981). See also David Schlueter, The Court-Martial: An Historical Survey, 87 MIm. L.
REv. 129, 131-44 (1980) (tracing the present day system of military discipline to the
Roman Empire).
32. General S.T. Ansell, a major influence in the development of our current system
of military discipline, wrote at the beginning of this century that:
the existing system of Military Justice is un-American, having come to us by
inheritance and rather witless adoption out of a system of government which
we regard as fundamentally intolerable . . . belonging ... to an age when
armies were but bodies of armed retainers and bands of mercenaries . . . a
system arising out of and regulated by the mere power of Military Command
rather than Law.
Samuel T. Ansell, Military Justice, 5 CoRmrLL L.Q. 1 (1919).
33. The Articles of War underwent major amendment in 1776, 1786, 1806, 1874, 1916,
1920, and 1948. Among the significant changes were the reduction of the number
of members required to convene a general court-martial, changes in the designation
of officers empowered to convene courts-martial, and the addition of a field officer
court-martial, precursor of the summary court-martial. Schlueter, supra note 31, at
145-55.
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way in the Colonies. As part of the concept of popular sovereignty,
they had whatever rights all other citizens were seeking, to the extent
possible in military service. For example, religious practice was pre-
scribed by the British Articles of War.34 By comparison, religious free-
dom was recognized in the American Articles of War.35 Additionally,
some attempt was made to limit the cruelty of punishments meted out
by courts-martial. 36 The adoption of the British Articles was later ques-
tioned by at least one acknowledged patriot, John Adams.3 7 He could
not understand why a nation which was committing itself to individual
34. All Officers and Soldiers, not having just Impediment, shall diligently frequent
Divine Service and Sermon... such [of them] as willfully absent themselves,
or, being present, behave indecently or irreverently, shall [be punished by
court-martial; and] [w]hatsoever Officer or Soldier shall presume to speak
against any known Article of the Christian Faith, shall be delivered to the Civil
Magistrate, to be proceeded against according to Law.
British Articles of War of 1765, § I, arts. I and II, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note
29, app. VII, at 931 (emphasis added).
35. "It is earnestly recommended to all officers and soldiers, diligently to attend divine
services .... ." Id. at app. IX, art. II, at 953 (quoting The American Articles of War
of 1775) (emphasis added).
Ironically, despite this conscious effort to rid the military of enforced religious
practices, the federal courts were called upon to rule, nearly two hundred years
later, that the armed forces' service academies could not force their students to
attend chapel service in the name of military discipline. Anderson v. Laird, 466
F.2d 283 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972). However, the Supreme Court
later ruled that the military can forbid the wearing of religious attire in the name
of military discipline. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
36. [N]o persons shall be sentenced by a court-martial to suffer death, except in
the cases expressly mentioned in the foregoing articles; nor shall any punish-
ment be inflicted at the discretion of a court-martial, other than degrading,
cashiering, drumming out of the army, whipping not exceeding thirty-nine
lashes, fine not exceeding two months pay of the offender, imprisonment not
exceeding one month.
American Articles of War of 1775, WiNTmoP, supra note 29, at 957, art. LI. Win-
throp observed that the colonists felt a need to limit military punishments because:
[t]he disrepute into [which flogging] has fallen is in great part due to the fact
that formerly, in the British service, it was carried to a brutal and perilous
extreme. "Five hundred lashes" was a not uncommon sentence; one thousand
were imposed in repeated recorded cases; and fifteen hundred and even two
thousand were sometimes reached. The execution of such sentences, while
savage in its cruelty to the subject was demoralizing to those who inflicted and
witnessed it.
Id. at 439.
37. John Adams, responsible for their hasty adoption by our Continental Congress
to meet an emergency, said of them: "There was extant, I observed, one system
of Articles of War which had carried two empires to the head of mankind, the
Roman and the British; for the British Articles of War are only a literal trans-
lation of the Roman .... So undigested were the notions of liberty prevalent
among the majority of the members most zealously attached to the public cause
that to this day I scarcely know how it was possible that those articles should
have been carried ...."
Ansell, supra note 32, at 3-4.
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freedoms and liberties would subject its citizens who served to protect
those freedoms to the tyranny that it was seeking to unshackle.
In the early part of the twentieth-century Brigadier General Samuel
T. Ansell, the acting Judge Advocate General of the Army, proposed a
drastic change to the existing Articles of War.38 General AnseU had
sought, unsuccessfully, to make the administration of discipline in the
army more uniform throughout the service and subject to a centralized
reviewing authority at the highest level of command in Army Head-
quarters. 39 During the time of his service, General Ansell observed, and
was critical of, many practices in the Army. Among his criticisms were
the lack of formal appeal of court-martial convictions and an absence of
a centralized corps of legally trained officers with the authority to seek
correction or modification of court-martial judgments in an effort to bring
uniformity to the decisions made in the field.40 While these concepts
were radical at the time, they would become commonplace notions in
military law within four decades.
During World War II, the nation witnessed its largest military mo-
bilization in history. More than 16 million men and women volunteered
for, or were conscripted into, active military service. 41 By the end of the
War, tens of thousands of citizens were deprived of their liberty through
the military's system of discipline. 42 The returning soldier-citizens told
many tales of drastic measures taken at courts-martial. Not only were
defendants convicted of seemingly minor offenses and sentenced to
extremely harsh punishments, but those convicted were receiving dif-
ferent punishments from their counterparts in the same or different
command units. 43 The factual truth behind these stories was no more
38. The dispute between Ansell and Crowder entailed both professional differences
and personal ambition. See generally Frederick Wiener, The Seamy Side of the World
War I Court-Martial Controversy, 123 MnL. L. REv. 109 (1989); and Terry Brown, The
Crowder-Ansell Dispute: The Emergence of General Samuel T. Ansell, 35 MIL. L. REv. 1
(1967).
39. Ansell, supra note 32, at 4.
40. Id. at 16-17.
41. BUR. OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957, at 735 (1960).
42. Long before they had a chance to fight for democracy, scores of American
soldiers-officers as well as enlisted men-were executed by a vicious, unde-
mocratic court-martial system. Forty-eight thousand men who once wore the
uniform of the United States Army or Navy are today serving sentences im-
posed by a jury not of their peers, but of judges with superior rank.... While
the Negro GI was the likeliest victim of our outmoded and unjust military
courts, men and women of all races and religions suffered under the system.
Adam Clayton Powell, The Rape of Justice by Court Martial, reprinted in 92 CONG. REC.
APP. A3381 (1946).
At another post, three Negro Soldiers have recently been Court Martialed and
sent to prison for Five years, for telling a Major that they were not physically
fit for a heavy laboring detail to which they had been assigned. Yet, these
men had all before been recommended by the Medical Authorities for dis-
charges because of their physical conditions.... On or about 20 January five
other men who are in the same category as the above three were told by a
Major when they protested that they could not do pick and shovel work, "If I
had you Niggers in my section of the country, I'd make you work." Then
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important than the great ire they inspired in the nation and in Con-
gress.44 Sensing the political urgency of changing the existing system,
the Department of the Navy and the Department of War both attempted
to redraft their regulations and encouraged Congress to amend the
Articles of War and the Articles for the Governance of the Navy.45
However, the events of the day overtook both of these efforts. With the
passage of the National Security Act of 1947,46 the Department of the
Navy and the Department of War were merged into the Department of
Defense. All of the armed forces, except the Coast Guard, were then
brought under a single cabinet level department. Congress then under-
took the development of legislation which would provide for the uniform
administration of discipline in all branches of the armed forces. The
result of this effort was monumental. The Uniform Code of Military
Justice (U.C.M.J.)47 was without precedent in the modern world. It was
the first significant change in the administration of military discipline in
the American armed forces since 1775 when the Continental Congress
adopted what were essentially the military codes of King Gustavus
Adolphus.
Among the major changes brought about by the adoption of the
U.C.M.J. was, as conveyed in its title, uniformity among the several
services, For the first time in the nation's history the procedural and
substantive law of military discipline was going to be the same in all of
the military services. 4 In addition, the U.C.M.J. created a centralized
review panel in each of the armed forces which had jurisdiction to hear
the appeals of defendants whose sentences had reached certain jurisdic-
tional thresholds. 49 However, the most significant change in military
discipline brought about by the U.C.M.J. was the creation of the Court
about ten minutes later he threatened to Court Martial a Negro Officer because
the Officer protested his statement.
Letter from a Negro Soldier to the Reverend Dr. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., Dated
June 2, 1944. Reprinted in PHILLIP McGumE, TAPS FOR A JIM CROW ARMY: LMrriRS
FROM BLACK SOLDIERS IN WORLD WAR I1, 54 (1983).
44. There are those who maintain that most of these reports were without substance
and that the administration of discipline in the armed forces was fair. See, e.g.,
Schlueter, supra note 31, at 158 n.114.
45. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 80-759, Title II, 62 Stat. 627 (1948).
46. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (1947).
47. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 81-506, 64 Stat. 107, 108-49 (1950)
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (Supp. 1990 ).
48. Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the conduct of
soldiers had been regulated by the Articles of War, the conduct of sailors and
marines by the Articles for the Governance of the Navy, 34 U.S.C. § 1200, and the
conduct of Coast Guardsmen by other laws, 14 U.S.C. §§ 561-576 (1946) (Supp. IV
1951). The Air Force had become independent of the Army in 1947 and the existing
Articles of War were made applicable to the Air Force in 1948. Pub .L. No. 80-775,
62 Stat 1014 (1948).
49. The U.C.M.J. originally required that any sentence that included the death penalty,
a punitive discharge, confinement for at least a year, or affected an admiral or
general be reviewed by a Board of Review. 50 U.S.C. § 653 (1946) (Supp. IV 1951).
The Boards of Review were re-named as the Courts of Military Review in 1968.
Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968). Currently,
the Courts of Military Review may accept a waiver of review of any conviction,
unless the sentence includes death. 10 U.S.C. § 861 (1988).
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of Military Appeals. The Court of Military Appeals was originally cre-
ated as a three member panel of civilian judges ° having jurisdiction to
hear mandatory appeals in cases involving the death penalty, the con-
viction of a flag or general officer, or in cases where the Judge Advocate
General of one of the armed forces had certified a question for review.
The Court could also grant discretionary appeals in cases where one of
the armed forces' Boards of Review had rendered a final decision.5' In
many respects, the enactment of the U.C.M.J. represented the adoption
of many of the reforms first urged by General Ansell forty years earlier.
Through the U.C.M.J., Congress subjected all active-duty military
personnel, reservists undergoing training, service academy cadets and
midshipmen, discharged military personnel serving court-martial sen-
tences, and prisoners of war to court-martial jurisdiction. In addition,
Congress subjected military retirees, civilian contractors, and the depen-
dents of military personnel to court-martial jurisdiction. The formal
extension of court-martial jurisdiction over civilians sparked the earliest
challenges to the U.C.M.J. before the Supreme Court.5 2
COURTS-MARTIAL JURISDICTION CHALLENGES IN THE COURTS
In the 1955 term, the Supreme Court considered its -first major case
construing an article of the U.C.M.J. In Toth v. Quarles,5 3 the Supreme
Court was confronted with the court-martial of a former Air Force en-
listed man who had been honorably discharged prior to the institution
of court-martial proceedings. 54 After he was discharged and working in
Pittsburgh as a steel worker, military authorities seized Toth and forcibly
took him to Korea. He was then charged with a murder and a conspiracy
to commit murder that had taken place during the time when he was
previously on active duty and stationed in Korea. His sister filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking his return to the United
States and release from military custody.55
50. In 1989 Congress amended the U.C.M.J. to create two additional seats on the Court
of Military Appeals to bring total active membership to five. Defense Authorization
Act, Pub. L. No. 101-189 § 1301(c) (1989). There were apparently several factors
which favored this change. Among them was a recent history of instability in the
membership on the Court due to retirements, illness, or resignations. H.R. CON.
REP. No. 101-331, 657, reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 838,
1114.
51. 50 U.S.C. § 654 (Supp. IV 1946). In 1983 the U.C.M.J. was amended to remove
mandatory review of the convictions of admirals and generals. Military Justice Act
of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, 97 Stat. 1393 (1983).
52. This was not the first time that the law provided that individuals who were not
members of the armed forces would be subject to court-martial jurisdiction. Article
63 of the Articles of War provided that "[a]ll retainers to the camp, and all persons
serving with the armies of the United States in the field, though not enlisted
soldiers, are to be subject to orders, according to the rules and discipline of war."
Rev. Stat. of the United States, § 1342 (1878 2d ed.).
53. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
54. The U.C.M.J. was not the Congress' first extension of court-martial jurisdiction
over legally discharged veterans. The Articles of War had a similar provision in
the 19th century. See generally WIrrTHoP, supra note 29, at 92.
55. The writ was initially issued by the District Court. Toth v. Talbott, 114 F. Supp.
468 (D.D.C. 1953). However, the Circuit Court reversed. Toth v. Talbott, 215 F.2d
22 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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The government argued that it had jurisdiction to seize and court-
martial Toth pursuant to article 3(a) of the U.C.M.J. which provided that
court-martial jurisdiction could be exercised over:
any person charged with having committed, while in a status in
which he was subject to this code, an offense against this code,
punishable by confinement of five years or more and for which
the person cannot be tried in the courts of the United States or
any state or territory thereof or of the District of Columbia.5
The Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that such an ex-
tension of court-martial jurisdiction was unconstitutional.5 7 In the
Court's opinion, neither Congress nor the President could constitution-
ally exercise their war powers to try by court-martial a civilian residing
in the United States in peacetime. s The Court concluded that this
exercise of military power "encroached on the jurisdiction of federal
courts set up under article III of the Constitution where persons on trial
are surrounded with more constitutional safeguards than in military
tribunals." 59
Further, the Court emphasized the functional and constitutional dif-
ferences between judicial courts and military tribunals. Among these
differences were the independence of the judiciary, the right to trial by
jury, and the right to grand jury indictment before a criminal prosecu-
tion. The Court went on to state, in frequently quoted language, that it
found:
[N]othing in the history or constitutional treatment of military
tribunals which entitles them to rank along with article III courts
as adjudicators of guilt or innocence . . . unlike courts, it is the
primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to,
fight wars should the occasion arise. But the trial of soldiers to
maintain discipline is merely incidental to an army's primary fighting
function. To the extent that those responsible for performance of
this primary function are diverted from it by the necessity of
trying cases the basic fighting purpose of armies is not served.
And conceding to military personnel that high degree of honesty
and sense of justice which nearly all of them undoubtedly have,
it still remains true that military tribunals have not been and
probably never can be constituted in such a way that they can
have the same kind of qualifications that the Constitution has
deemed the essential to the fair trial of civilians in federal courts. 60
The language of Toth set the stage for all of the Court's future handling
of court-martial jurisdiction, up to Solorio.
Also in the 1955 term, the Supreme Court, in two cases, first exam-
ined the authority of Congress to authorize the trial by court-martial of
civilian dependents of members of the armed forces. In Kinsella v. Krue-
56. 50 U.S.C. § 553 (1952).
57. Toth, 350 U.S. at 14-15.
58. Id. at 14.
59. Id. at 15.
60. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
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ger,61 the wife of a U.S. Army colonel was tried by general court-martial
for the murder of her husband in Japan, and in Reid v. Covert,62 the wife
of an Air Force sergeant was tried by general court-martial for his murder
while he was stationed in England. Both of these cases were tried as
capital offenses. 63 The Army and the Air Force asserted court-martial
jurisdiction over the women under article 2(11) of the U.C.M.J. which
provided that those subject to court-martial jurisdiction included "all
persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces
without the continental limits of the United States and without [certain
United States] territories .... ,64
Writing for a five member majority, Justice Clark reasoned that Con-
gress has the authority to provide for the criminal trials of American
citizens in foreign countries through a system of territorial or consular
courts established under article I of the Constitution. Therefore, the
Court had no need to examine Congress' war powers in these cases. 65
Three dissenting members of the Court made known their disagreement
with the majority but, noting the press of business during the dosing
days of the Court's term, promised to file written dissents during the
next term.66 Justice Frankfurter recognized the "[g]rave issues affecting
the status of American civilians throughout the world"67 which were
raised in these cases and also reserved a full expression of his views
until the following term.
On November 5, 195668 the Court ordered a rehearing in both Covert
and Krueger and on rehearing the Court overruled both earlier deci-
sions. 69 The Court observed that the cases dealt with basic constitutional
61. 351 U.S. 470 (1956).
62. 351 U.S. 487 (1956).
63. In neither case was the defendant actually sentenced to death. Mrs. Covert was
sentenced to confinement at hard labor for life, 351 U.S. at 488, as was Mrs. Smith.
Id. at 472. However, Mrs. Covert's conviction was overturned by the Court of
Military Appeals on non-jurisdictional grounds, 6 C.M.A. 46 (1955), and she was
awaiting retrial in Washington, D.C. at the time of the Supreme Court's action.
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed on Mrs. Smith's behalf by her
father, Walter Krueger. Krueger, 351 U.S. at 472.
64. 50 U.S.C. § 552(11) (1952) (emphasis added).
65. Having determined that one in the circumstances of Mrs. Smith [or Mrs.
Covert] may be tried before a legislative court established by Congress, we
have no need to examine the power of Congress "To make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" under article I of
the Constitution. If it is reasonable and consonant with due process for Con-
gress to employ the existing system of courts-martial for this purpose, the
enactment must be sustained.
Krueger, 351 U.S. at 476 (citation omitted).
66. Id. at 485 (Warren, C.J., and Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
67. Id. at 483.
68. Reid v. Covert, 352 U.S. 901 (1956). During the 1956 term the Court underwent
significant personnel changes. Justice William Brennan joined the Court in 1956,
replacing Justice Sherman Minton, who retired that same year. Justice Charles
Whittaker joined the court in 1957, replacing Justice Stanley Reed. However, Justice
Brennan did not participate in the decision to rehear Covert and Krueger. Id. at 902.
Justice Whittaker did not participate in the decision. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,
41 (1957).
69. Covert II, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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issues which called into question the role the military should play in our
democratic system.70 By permitting the military to extend its jurisdiction
to civilians accompanying members of the armed forces overseas, Con-
gress would encroach on the jurisdiction of the civilian courts established
under article III of the Constitution.71 Such interference with article III
courts would undermine the Constitution's safeguards in the criminal
process and render those safeguards ineffective. 72
Explaining the Constitution's role as a barrier to government arbi-
trariness, the Court asserted that its protection does not stop at the
nation's borders. Thus, even in establishing legislative courts, Congress
does not have the power to deprive citizens of the rights the Constitution
provides in a criminal prosecution. Since the acts committed by Mrs.
Covert and Mrs. Smith were crimes as contemplated in the sixth amend-
ment to the Constitution, they were both entitled to the protection and
procedural safeguards provided by the Constitution. These protections
include the right to a grand jury indictment, the right to a trial by jury,
and the right to be tried before a judge who was a member of an
independent judiciary. Finally, Congress' authority to make rules for
the government and regulation of the armed forces under the Consti-
tution, given its plain meaning, indicates that the term "land and naval
forces" includes only members of the armed forces, not wives, depen-
dents, and other civilians accompanying service members. Therefore,
the Court ruled, any attempt by military courts to try civilians in this
manner is inconsistent with the Constitution.
In 1960 the Supreme Court again confronted the constitutionality of
the jurisdictional provisions of the U.C.M.J. In Kinsella v. Singleton,73
the mother of a woman who had been convicted by a court-martial of
killing her child while living with her husband, an American soldier
stationed in post-war Germany, sought her release from a federal prison.
This case differed from Krueger and Covert, the government argued, in
that it concerned the jurisdiction of courts-martial over a civilian depen-
dent who had been charged with the non-capital offense of manslaughter
in peacetime. 74
The Solicitor General argued that Krueger and Covert dealt only with
capital offenses and that a military commander needed to control the
lives of civilian dependents living on his base in order to more effectively
control his troops.75 The government also argued that historical prece-
70. Id. at 3.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
74. Singleton was a companion case with three others which involved the jurisdiction
of courts-martial over civilian employees of the military who accompany the military
outside of the United States for both capital, Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960)
(capital murder) and non-capital offenses, McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281
(1960) (conspiracy and larceny from the military by a civilian accountant); Wilson
v. Bohlender, 361 U.S. 287 (1960) (sodomy committed by a civilian employee with
members of the military).
75. [The government] submits that such necessities are controlling in the case of
civilian dependents charged with noncapital crimes. It points out that such
dependents affect the military community as a whole; that they have, in fact,
been permitted to enjoy their residence in such communities on the represen-
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dent supported its position that the trial by court-martial of civilian
dependents was not unconstitutional. 76 In denying the government's
jurisdictional claim in non-capital cases, the Court rejected the historical
analysis proffered by the government and questioned the actual impact
on the discipline of the troops of depriving a military commander court-
martial jurisdiction over civilian dependents." The Court further noted
that the historical data relied on by the government dealt with a military
during the Revolutionary War 8 or during the wars with the Native
American nations during the expansion of the United States' western
frontier79 and not with an army which was operating essentially in a
time of peace.
The Court did not consider the issue of the jurisdiction of courts-
tation that they are subject to military control; and that realistically they are a
part of the military establishment. It argues that, from a morale standpoint,
the present need for dependents to accompany American forces maintained
abroad is a pressing one; that their special status as integral parts of the military
community requires disciplinary control over them by the military commander;
that the effectiveness of this control depends upon a readily available machin-
ery affording a prompt sanction and resulting deterrent present only in court-
martial jurisdiction; and that not only is court-martial procedure inherently fair
but there are no alternatives to it.
Singleton, 361 U.S. at 238.
76. Its legal theory is based on historical materials which it asserts indicate a well-
established practice of court-martial jurisdiction over civilians accompanying
the armed forces, during Colonial days as well as the formative period of our
Constitution. From this it concludes that civilian dependents may be included
as a necessary and proper incident to the congressional power "To make Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," as granted
in Clause 14.
Id. at 239.
77. Furthermore, we are not convinced that a critical impact upon discipline will
result, as claimed by the Government (even if anyone deemed this a relevant
consideration), if noncapital offenses are given the same treatment as capital
ones by virtue of the second Covert case. The same necessities claimed here
were found present in the second Covert case (see the dissent there) and were
rejected by the Court. Even if the necessity for court-martial jurisdiction be
relevant in cases involving deprivation of the constitutional rights of civilian
dependents, which we seriously question, we doubt that the existence of the
small number of noncapital cases now admitted by the Government in its brief
here, when spread over the world-wide coverage of military installations,
would of itself bring on such a crisis.
Id. at 243 (citation omitted).
78. "Furthermore, those trials during the Revolutionary Period, on which it is claimed
that court-martial jurisdiction rests, were all during a period of war, and hence are
inapplicable here." Guagliardo, 361 U.S. at 284.
To be sure, the 1872 opinion of the Attorney General, dealing with civilians
serving with troops in the building of defensive earthworks to protect against
threatened Indian uprisings, is entitled to some weight. However, like the
other examples of frontier activities based on the legal concept of the troops'
being "in the field," they are inapposite here. They were in time of "hostilities"
with Indian tribes or were in "territories" governed by entirely different con-
siderations."
Id. at 285-86.
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martial again until its 1968-1969 term. In June 1969 the Supreme Court
ruled that in order for a court-martial to have jurisdiction to try a current
active member of the armed forces for an offense, the offense charged
must have some connection to the military service. In O'Callahan v.
Parker,80 an army sergeant stationed in the Territory of Hawaii visited
the city of Honolulu while on an evening pass from Fort Shafter, Oahu.
After drinking in the bar of a hotel, Sergeant O'Callahan broke into a
room occupied by a young girl and assaulted and attempted to rape her.
While fleeing from this crime, he was apprehended by a hotel security
guard and turned over to Honolulu city police officers. When the civilian
police learned that he was an active-duty soldier, he was delivered to
military authorities. O'Callahan was charged with attempted rape,
housebreaking, and assault with intent to rape in violation of articles 80,
130, and 134 of the U.C.M.J.8 1 He was tried by a general court-martial,
convicted and sentenced to ten years' confinement at hard labor, forfei-
ture of all military pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge
from the army.82 While imprisoned pursuant to this conviction, O'Cal-
lahan filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied by
the district court and the circuit court.83 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether the court-martial had jurisdiction to try
O'Callahan for the offenses. 84
Writing for a five member majority, Justice Douglas first acknowl-
edged "that the exigencies of military discipline require the existence of
a special system of military courts in which not all of the specific pro-
cedural protection deemed essential in Art. III trials need apply." Jus-
tice Douglas then determined that at stake in the case were a soldier's
civil rights to a trial by jury in a civilian court as guaranteed by the sixth
amendment and article I of the Constitution. 86 He reiterated, with
emphasis, an observation from Toth v. Quarles87 that Congress' power to
authorize a trial by court-martial should be limited to "the least possible
power adequate to the end proposed ... [because] courts-martial as an
institution are singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of
constitutional law."8
80. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
81. 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 930, and 934 (Supp. V 1952).
82. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 260.
83. U.S. ex rel O'Callahan v. Parker, 390 F.2d 360 (3rd Cir. 1968).
84. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the following question:
Does a court-martial, held under the Articles of War, Tit. 10, U.S.C. § 801 et
seq., have jurisdiction to try a member of the Armed Forces who is charged
with commission of a crime cognizable in a civilian court and having no military
significance, alleged to have been committed off-post and while on leave, thus
depriving him of his constitutional rights to indictment by grand jury and trial
by a petit jury in a civilian court?"
O'Callahan v. Parker, 393 U.S. 822 (1968).
85. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 261.
86. Id. at 262.
87. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
88. This last observation by Justice Douglas was nearly totally insensitive to the great
strides that the military discipline system had taken since enactment of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. It was seen as a personal attack on those who labored to
make the military system work with what is known as "military due process." Id.
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The Court then noted that, at the time of his crimes, O'Callahan was
properly absent from Fort Shafter, there was no connection between his
crimes and his military duties, his victim was not performing any service
related to the armed forces, and the crimes were committed in a time of
peace. Moreover, the then Territory of Hawaii was not under military
governance, and therefore its civilian courts were open and capable of
trying the case against O'Callahan. The Court found that, under these
circumstances, O'Callahan could not have been tried by court-martial
for these crimes. 89
Soon after its decision in O'Callahan, the Court took the opportunity
to further explain the basis of court-martial jurisdiction in Relford v.
Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks.90 Relford was a serviceman sta-
tioned in New Jersey in 1961. He had been convicted of the abduction
and rapes of two relatives of other servicemen. While serving his sen-
tence in Fort Leavenworth, Relford sought relief from the article EII courts
in the form of a writ of habeas corpus. His petition was dismissed by
the district court as well as the circuit court.91 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on the issue of the retroactivity of O'Callahan. In
ultimately rejecting Relford's petition for habeas corpus, the Court gave
form to twelve criteria previously touched upon by the O'Callahan Court
for determining whether a member of the armed forces has committed
a crime that is service-connected. They are: (1) the members's absence
from the base; (2) the commission of the crime away from the base;
(3) the commission of the crime at a place not under military control;
(4) the commission of the crime within the territorial limits of the United
States; (5) the commission of the crime in a time of peace and its lack of
relation to the war powers; (6) the absence of any connection between
the crime and the member's military duties; (7) the absence of any
relation between the victim and the performance of military duties;
(8) the availability of civilian courts to try the crime; (9) the absence of
the flouting of military authority; (10) the absence of any threat to a
military reservation; (11) the absence of any damage to military property;
at 265. In response, many supporters of the military system criticized the O'Callahan
decision, not because of its ultimate holding, but because of the venom in Justice
Douglas' language.
I have served as Chief Judge of [the Court of Military Appeals] since its creation
by Congress as the Supreme Court for the military justice system. I have seen
instances of arbitrary power that could not be reconciled with our concepts of
impartial justice. Some of the abuses in individual cases were corrected; others
were not, but all of the instances of abuse were alien to the system, just as
instances of injustice resulting from arbitrary and venal judges and lawyers in
the civilian community are alien to the principles of justice in civilian law.
See, e.g., United States v. Borys, 18 C.M.A. 547, 559 (1969).
89. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 273. In addition to criticizing the reasoning of Justice
Douglas' opinion, the Court's dissenters and many commentators predicted that
there would be a great deal of confusion and litigation concerning the issue of
"service-connection" ("The Court does not explain the scope of the 'service-con-
nected' crimes as to which court-martial jurisdiction is appropriate, but it appears
that jurisdiction may extend to 'nonmilitary' offenses in appropriate circum-
stances."). Id. at 283 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
90. 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
91. Relford v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 409 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1969).
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and (12) the crime being among those traditionally prosecuted in civilian
courts. 92 The facts showed that Relford was not absent from the base
when the crime was committed, that one of the victims was performing
a duty relating to the military, and that the security of two women on a
military post was threatened. 93 Thus, here, the military tribunal properly
exercised jurisdiction.
O'Callahan and Relford marked a new era in the trial of courts-martial.
Although earlier courts-martial had been primarily, but not exclusively
concerned with military-related offenses, 94 after O'Callahan and Relford,
courts-martial were specifically restricted to "service-connected" cases.
Much confusion developed in the military appellate courts surrounding
the issue of service connection. However, there soon developed a juris-
prudence which gave some predictability to the outcome of contested
service connection issues. By 1987 it was clear that any offense occurring
on a military reservation was per se service-connected 95 and most offenses
that had any effect on the military were considered service-connected.
SOLORIO AND ITS IMPACT
In 1987 the Supreme Court confronted the issue of court-martial
jurisdiction once again. In Solorio v. United States97 the Court considered
the case of a Coast Guardsman who had been charged with sexually
molesting the daughters of several other members of the Coast Guard.
While he was stationed on Governor's Island New York, it was learned
that Solorio had assaulted the daughter of a fellow Coast Guardsman
while both were stationed at the Thirteenth Coast Guard District Head-
quarters in Juneau, Alaska. Further investigation revealed that Solorio
had committed similar offenses while at Governor's Island. The Alaskan
offenses actually took place in the civilian community, although the
victims were the children of active-duty military personnel.98 At his
military trial Solorio challenged the jurisdiction of the court-martial over
the Alaskan offenses, claiming that they were not service-connected
under the principles established in O'Callahan and Relford.99 The military
judge dismissed the Alaskan offenses, and the Government appealed
his ruling. The Coast Guard Court of Military Review'00 and the Court
92. Relford, 401 U.S. at 365.
93. Id. at 366.
94. Military commanders, who exercise prosecutorial discretion in the system of mili-
tary discipline, are primarily concerned with the execution of their assigned duties.
Therefore, if left to their natural inclinations, they would probably devote most of
their prosecutorial resources to offenses which have a direct impact on the ability
of their command to perform. However, principles of Constitutional protection
should notbe left to the good will and clear understanding of those not primarily
charged with their oversight.
95. Relford, 401 U.S. at 369.
96. See generally Jonathan Tomes, The Imagination of the Prosecutor: The Only Limitation to
Off-Post Jurisdiction Now, Fifteen Years After O'Callahan v. Parker, 25 AIR FORCE L.
REv. 1 (1985).
97. 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
98. United States v. Solorio, 21 M.J. 512, 514 at n.1 (C.G.C.M.R. 1985).
99. Id. at 512, 512-13.
100. Id. at 512.
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of Military Appeals' 01 both held that the Alaskan offenses were service-
connected. Solorio successfully petitioned for review by the Supreme
Court to determine, inter alia, whether a court-martial may "find that
[an] offense committed by [a] service member off-base at [a] place where
there is no military post or enclave is service-connected simply because
of [the] victim's civilian dependent status." 10 2
In affirming the military Appellate Courts, the Supreme Court held
that, not only were the Alaskan offenses within the jurisdiction of a
court-martial, but any conduct committed by any active-duty member
of the armed forces, in any location, can constitutionally be made the
subject of court-martial jurisdiction. 103 The only test for court-martial
jurisdiction, the Court held, was the status of the accused. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, a longtime critic of the O'Callahan and Relford decisions,
authored the Court's opinion in Solorio. His reasoning was based on his
disagreement with the O'Callahan Court's analysis of the historical prec-
edents of American courts-martial and his interpretation of the plain
language of the Constitution.'4 In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens
termed the overruling of O'Callahan and Relford both "unnecessary" and
"unwise." 05 He noted that, in his opinion, Solorio's Alaskan offenses
were service-connected and, considering that the government had not
requested that O'Callahan necessarily be reconsidered "[t]he fact that any
five Members of the Court have the power to reconsider settled prece-
dents at random, does not make that practice legitimate." 10 6 However,
four justices agreed with Justice Rehnquist and the door was dosed to
jurisdictional defenses based on O'Callahan and Relford.10 7
CURRENT PRACTICE UNDER THE U.C.M.J.
At first glance, most of the public, as well as members of the bar
who are not familiar with the system of discipline in the military, would
probably think that courts-martial concern themselves primarily with
101. United States v. Solorio, 21 M.J. 251 (C.M.A. 1986).
102. Solorio v. United States, 54 U.S.L.W. 3819 (June 17, 1986) (No. 85-1581).
103. This case presents the question whether the jurisdiction of a court-martial
convened pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to try a
member of the Armed Forces depends on the "service connection" of the
offense charged. We hold that it does not, and overrule our earlier decision
in O'Callahan v Parker.
Solorio, 483 U.S. at 436.
104. "[The history of court-martial jurisdiction in England and in this country during
the 17th and 18th centuries is far too ambiguous to justify the restriction of Clause
14 which O'Callahan imported to it." Id. at 445 (citation omitted).
105. Id. at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 452.
107. On March 29, 1988 Representative Patricia Schroeder introduced the Court-Martial
Jurisdiction Act of 1988. The proposed legislation would have limited court-martial
jurisdiction to those acts which: (1) occur in time of war, (2) take place on military
property, (3) take place outside of the United States and are not otherwise triable
by the courts of the United States, and (4) petty offenses or the offense is service-
connected, including all drug offenses. H.R. 4282, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG.
Rc. H1298 (1988). The bill was referred to the Committee on Armed Services,
where it died in the face of strong opposition from the Department of Defense.
Letter from Pat Schroeder to Keith M. Harrison (Nov. 28, 1990).
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soldiers who have gone AWOL108 or disobeyed the orders of someone
superior in rank. 10 9 Because of the portrayal of military life in popular
culture, the public may believe that those miscreants suffer such pun-
ishments as "losing their stripes," spending a weekend peeling potatoes,
or, in extreme cases, getting "kicked out" of the military. While it is
true that the military discipline system does indeed punish those who
have committed the minor offenses"0 just noted, the cases discussed in
the previous section make dear, courts-martial are also empowered to
try the cases of those who stand accused of serious crimes such as
conspiracy,"' espionage,1 2 homicide," 3 rape, 1 4 arson, 115 or any non-
capital offense enumerated in the Federal Criminal Code."16 Far exceed-
ing the notion that a convicted soldier would merely spend a weekend
peeling potatoes, courts-martial are empowered to impose punishments
which can include long periods of confinement at hard labor,117 monetary
fines," forfeiture of future earnings,"19 punitive discharge from the mil-
itary,120 and, in some cases, the death penalty.' 2' Even when one is
expelled from the military as a result of receiving a punitive discharge
from a court-martial, the effects on one's future employment opportu-
nities are significant.' 22
The U.C.M.J.'12 provides a military commander with four possible
fora in which to punish an offending soldier. The least severe punish-
ment, is non-judicial punishment pursuant to article 15 of the U. C.M.J. 124
108. AWOL, or absence without leave, is one of several "absence" offenses punishable
under articles 85, 86, and 87 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 10 U.S.C.
§§ 885, 886, and 887 (1988).
109. Disobedience of orders is punishable under articles 90-92 or 94 of the U.C.M.J. 10
U.S.C. §§ 890-92, 894 (1988).
110. I use the term "minor" only to reflect how many outside of the military may
characterize these offenses. However, I do not wish to be placed in the position
of questioning the need of one in the military chain-of-command to expect loyalty
from those who are subordinate in rank, or to expect that they will be at their
assigned place of duty.
111. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JusTicE art. 82, 10 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
112. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JusTicE art. 106, 10 U.S.C. § 906 (1988).
113. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE arts. 118 and 119, 10 U.S.C. §§ 918 and 919
(1988).
114. UNrFoRM CODE OF MILITARY JUsTcE art. 120, 10 U.S.C. § 920 (1988).
115. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JusTIcE art. 126, 10 U.S.C. § 926 (1988).
116. Article 134, also known as the General Article, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1988), enables
courts-martial to try members of the armed forces for violations of such offenses
as violations of the immigration laws, United States v. Minaya, 30 M.J. 1179
(A.F.C.M.R. 1990) and United States v. Clark, 31 M.J. 721 (A.F.C.M.R. 1990).
117. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 1984 [hereinafter M.C.M.], Rule for
Courts-Martial 1003(b)(8).
118. Id., Rule for Courts-Martial 1003(b)(3).
119. Id., Rule for Courts-Martial 1003(b)(2) and (5).
120. Id., Rule for Courts-Martial 1003(b)(10).
121. Id., Rule for Courts-Martial 1003(b)(11).
122. The discharge that a soldier receives can impact future ability to obtain employment
and entitlement benefits based on veteran status, as well as create a social stigma
for the veteran. See, e.g., Charles Sandel, Other-Than-Honorable Military Administra-
tive Discharges: Time for Confrontation, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 839 (1984).
123. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-950 (1988).
124. 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1988). In the Army and the Air Force this punishment is referred
to simply as an article 15. In the Navy and Coast Guard the procedure is known
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This is by far the most commonly used form of punishment under the
U.C.M.J. 12 Military commanders are encouraged to use this form of
punishment to correct relatively minor infractions of discipline. 126 When
using this form of punishment, the commander is authorized to exact
fines, restrict liberty, imprison, or reduce the rank of the offending
soldier.127 In most instances, an individual punished pursuant to article
15 has the right to refuse to submit to such punishment, in which case
the commander must decide whether to drop the matter or to refer it to
a superior forum. However, individuals who are assigned to a vessel
do not have the right to refuse punishment under article 15 .128
The forum immediately superior to the non-judicial punishment
forum is the summary court-martial. 129 The summary court-martial con-
sists of a single commissioned officer who is simultaneously the finder
of law and fact, the presenter of the government's case, and the legal
assistant to the accused. The summary court-martial only has jurisdic-
tion to try the cases of enlisted members of the armed forces who have
been accused of non-capital offenses. A summary court-martial may
impose a punishment of confinement at hard labor for one month, hard
labor without confinement for forty-five days, restriction to specified
geographic limits for two months, or forfeiture of two-thirds of one
month's military pay.130 Although they are the most -frequently used
non-administrative tools of military discipline, and although convictions
before them can result in a loss of liberty, neither non-judicial punish-
ment under article 15 nor summary court-martial are considered "crim-
inal proceedings." This is because the accused does not have the
inviolate right to counsel and the accused has the right, except when
assigned to a vessel, to refuse trial by these procedures.' 3'
as Captain's Mast. In the Marine Corps the procedure is known as Office Hours.
DAVID A. SCILUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTIcE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 78
(2d ed. 1987).
125. In Fiscal Year 1988 the Army imposed punishment pursuant to article 15 in 91,915
cases for a rate of 118.5 cases per 1000 of its active-duty population. ANNUAL
REPORT ON MILITARY JUSTICE, 28 M.J. CXVII, CLXIII. The Navy and Marine Corps
imposed punishment pursuant to article 15 in 59,457 cases for a rate of 74.0 cases
per 1000 of their active-duty population. Id. at CLXXVII. The Air Force imposed
punishment pursuant to article 15 in 17,658 cases for a rate of 30.4 cases per 1000
of its active-duty population. Id. at CLXXXVIII. The Coast Guard imposed pun-
ishment pursuant to article 15 in 1763 cases for a rate of 47.4 cases per 1000 of its
active-duty population. Id. at CXCVII. Overall, in Fiscal Year 1988, the Armed
Forces imposed punishment pursuant to article 15 on 8% of its active-duty popu-
lation.
126. M.C.M., supra note 117, at Part V 1(e).
127. 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (1988).
128. 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1988).
129. 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1988). In Fiscal Year 1988 the Army imposed punishment using
summary courts-martial in 1313 cases. ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY JUSTICE, 28
M.J. CXVII, CLXII. The Navy and Marine Corps imposed punishment using sum-
mary courts-martial in 2497 cases. Id. at CLXXVI. The Air Force imposed punish-
ment using summary courts-martial in 25 cases. Id. at CLXXXVII. The Coast Guard
imposed punishment using summary courts-martial in 35 cases. Id. at CXCVI.
130. M.C.M., supra note 117, Rule for Courts-Martial 1301(d)(1).
131. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 34 (1976). However, this right can be something
of a "Hobson's choice" to a young inexperienced soldier who may not fully com-
prehend such things as his or her presumption of innocence, the prosecution's
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The two tools of military discipline provided by the U.C.M.J. that
are considered criminal proceedings by the Supreme Court are the spe-
cial court-martial and the general court-martial. 13 2 The special court-
martial must usually consist of a military judge and at least three court
members. 13 A military judge, unlike the judge of an article III court, is
not appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate for tenure
during good behavior.M A military judge of a special court-martial can
be any commissioned officer of the armed forces who is also a member
of the bar and certified for service as a military judge of the Judge
Advocate General of her service. 135 Since the special court-martial, as
all courts-martial, is an ad hoc tribunal, 136 the military judge does not
have a permanent assignment to the bench. In addition, as is the case
with all commissioned officers in the military, a military judge in the
armed forces is subject to dismissal by the President. 37 Further, a mil-
itary judge who is performing duties as the judge of a general court-
martial may only do so when such assignment is her primary duty.138
burden of proof, and affirmative defenses. If the imposition of punishment through
summary court-martial is to be considered during later court-martial sentencing
procedures, the soldier must have been given the opportunity to consult with a
military lawyer prior to making his choice to accept summary court-martial punish-
ment. United States v. Booker, 5 M.J. 238 (C.M.A. 1977).
132. 10 U.S.C. §§ 819 and 818 (1988). In Fiscal Year 1988 the Army imposed punishment
using special courts-martial in 1027 cases and using general courts-martial in 1560
cases. ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY JUSTICE, 28 M.J. CXVII, CLXII. The Navy
and Marine Corps imposed punishment using special courts-martial in 5614 cases
and using general courts-martial in 832 cases. Id. at CLXXVI. The Air Force
imposed punishment using special courts-martial in 756 cases and using general
courts-martial in 847 cases. Id. at CLXXXVII. The Coast Guard imposed punishment
using special courts-martial in 24 cases and using general courts-martial in 12 cases.
Id. at CXCVI.
133. In cases in which the special court-martial does not adjudge a bad-conduct dis-
charge, a military judge need not be assigned to the trial. However, even where a
military judge is not assigned to the trial, a special court-martial may adjudge a
bad-conduct discharge as part of its punishment if a military judge could not be
assigned because of physical conditions or military exigencies. 10 U.S.C. § 819
(1988).
134. In the original Uniform Code of Military Justice the individual who occupied this
position was referred to as the "law officer." 50 U.S.C. § 551(12) (1948) (Supp. IV
1951). In 1968 the U.C.M.J. underwent significant changes. See Military Justice
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632 (1968). Among these changes was the re-titling of
the law officer to military judge.
135. UNoR CODE OF MmITARY JusTIcE art. 26, 10 U.S.C. § 826 (1988).
136. A court-martial is brought into existence by a proper convening order which directs
the military judge to hear any case(s) brought before her at a given command. It
ceases to exist when the matters brought before it pursuant to that convening order
are disposed of. WI NTRoP, supra note 29, at 49.
137. "It is well-established law that military officers serve at the pleasure of the President
and have no constitutional right to be promoted or retained.. . ." Pauls v. Secretary
of the Air Force, 457 F.2d 294, 297 (1st Cir. 1972).
138. 10 U.S.C. § 826(c) (1988). See also United States v. Beckermann, 27 M.J. 334 (C.M.A.
1989). This is only one of several safeguards designed to ensure the independence
of military lawyers and judges operating under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. In theory adverse personnel actions are not to be taken against lawyers
and judges who are acting in accord with their roles under the Code. See, e.g., 10
U.S.C. § 826(c) ("neither the convening authority nor any member of his staff shall
prepare or review any report concerning the effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency of
BE ALL You CAN BE m 241
The members of the court-martial are frequently described as the
equivalent of jurors in a civilian criminal prosecution.139 However, while
members of a court-martial are the finders of fact 140 in the proceedings,
they are not intended to be peers of the accused nor are they intended
to represent a cross-section of the community. In fact, court-members
are selected by the convening authority based on his determination of
their fitness to serve when considering such factors as their military rank
and service history.14 ' The military judge' 42 and individual members of
a court-martial are subject to challenge at trial for cause. 43 To a limited
extent, court-martial members are subject to peremptory challenge.'4
Upon reaching a guilty verdict, a special court-martial may impose
a bad conduct discharge, confinement at hard labor for six months, hard
labor without confinement for three months, and forfeiture of two-thirds
pay per month for six months. However, a bad-conduct discharge may
not be imposed if either a military judge was not assigned to preside at
the court-martial or the defendant was not represented by an attorney
qualified to practice under the U.C.M.J. 45 Therefore, it is possible for a
soldier to be convicted at a court-martial and subsequently be jailed for
up to six months without the benefit of counsel or a judge presiding
over his trial.
Prior to referring a charge to a general court-martial, a commanding
officer is required to direct an investigation into the validity of the
the military judge . . .which relates to his performance of duty as a military
judge."); and 10 U.S.C. § 898 (which makes "knowingly and intentionally fail[ing]
to enforce or comply with any provision of [the U.C.M.J.] regulating the proceed-
ings before, during, or after trial of an accused" a punishable offense).
On the other hand, military lawyers and judges are nonetheless officers. They
are steeped in the traditions of military service. In fact, in the Marine Corps and
the Coast Guard all military lawyers are considered "line officers" subject to as-
signments unrelated to their training as lawyers, such as platoon commanders or
ship's captains. In such a case, it is natural that such officers will want to fashion
themselves as "team" players in order to be considered for prestigious assignments.
However, there are also indications that military lawyers and judges can also be
mavericks as officers. In a recent case, judges of the Navy-Marine Corps Court of
Military Review refused orders to be interviewed by representatives of the Inspector
General of the Department of Defense in connection with their duties as appellate
military judges. These officers sought the protection of the Court of Military
Appeals in preserving their judicial independence. United States Navy-Marine
Corps Court of Military Review v. Carlucci, 26 M.J. 328 (1988).
139. See, e.g., Monk v. Zelez, 901 F.2d 885, 889 n.5 (10th Cir. 1990) ("The court-martial
members .. .serve the same function in the court-martial as a jury in a civilian
proceeding.").
140. 10 U.S.C. § 851 (1988).
141. 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (1988) (commanding officers are directed to choose as members
of courts-martial individuals who are "best qualified... by reason of age, education,
training, experience, length of [military] service, and judicial temperament.").
142. 10 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1988).
143. 10 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1988).
144. 10 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1988). The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides that each
accused at a court-martial shall have the right to one peremptory challenge without
regard to the number or type of charges for which she is being tried. By contrast,
individuals being tried in federal district courts are entitled to a number of per-
emptory challenges, ranging from 3 to 20, based on the type of charge for which
they are being tried. Fed. Rules of Crim. Procedure, Rule 24(b).
145. 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1988).
242 m HARVARD BLACKLETTER JOURNAL U VOL. 8, 1991
charge.' 46 The officer investigating the charge need not be trained in
the law. However, the commanding officer must obtain advice from his
primary legal advisor as to the sufficiency of the evidence. 147 If the legal
advisor does not believe that there is sufficient credible evidence to refer
the charge to a general court-martial, the commanding officer is bound
by that determination. 148 The accused, or anyone suspected of involve-
ment in the investigated crime, has the right to be present at the inves-
tigation, 149 with counsel,' 0 and the right to ask questions of the
witnesses appearing before the investigating officer.' 5' The accused also
has the right to call his own witnesses to testify before the investigating
officer. 152 This procedure has been compared to the civilian grand jury
process.'5 3 However, since a federal civilian criminal trial can only pro-
ceed if the grand jury hands up a true bill or indictment, the differences
between a general court-martial and a federal civilian criminal trial seem
more' obvious than do the similarities. A general court-rartial may
impose any punishment authorized under the U.C.M.J., including the
penalty of death.
At a special court-martial, 54 both the verdict and the sentence' 5 are
arrived at by a two-thirds majority vote of the court-martial members
who are present at the time the vote is taken. At a general court-martial,
the verdict and sentence are also arrived at by two-thirds majority vote
except when the sentence exceeds ten years confinement at hard labor
or the death penalty. In those cases, the decision must be arrived at by
a three-fourths majority vote. 5 6 In the case of the death penalty, the
decision must be unanimous. 15 7 Except in the case of capital offenses,
an accused may waive his right to trial by court-martial members and
request a trial before a military judge alone. 158 In such a case the military
judge would also bear the responsibility of sentencing the accused.' 19
Additionally, an accused may plead guilty, waive trial on the merits,
and request sentencing either by court members or by the military judge
alone. 60 Also, as in civilian practice, plea bargaining plays a substantial
role in the military discipline system.' 6'
One major difference between the military discipline system and
civilian criminal justice system is the placement of prosecutorial discre-
tion in the system. In civilian practice typically, the chief elected, or
politically appointed, prosecuting attorney in any jurisdiction has dis-
146. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1988).
147. 10 U.S.C. § 834 (1988).
148. Id.




153. Schlueter, supra note 124, at 197.
154. 10 U.S.C. § 852(a)(2) (1988).
155. 10 U.S.C. § 852(b)(3) (1988).
156. 10 U.S.C. § 852(b)(2) (1988).
157. 10 U.S.C. § 852(b)(1) (1988).
158. 10 U.S.C. §§ 816(1)(B) and 818 (1988).
159. 10 U.S.C. § 851(d) (1988).
160. 10 U.S.C. § 845(b) (1988).
161. See generally Schlueter, supra note 124, at 388.
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cretion as to whether to proceed to trial in any given case. The exercise
of such a decision can be judged by the electorate in a later election.
Typically, such a person is legally trained and has some amount of legal
experience prior to assuming his position. However, in the military
system, as must be the case to maintain the strict discipline required in
a martial community, the decision to punish a subordinate is entirely in
the hands of a commanding officer. 62 Acting within the framework of
the U.C.M.J., a commanding officer will determine whether charges are
referred to a court-martial. In fact, the verdict and sentence of a court-
martial are purely advisory opinions to be considered by the command-
ing officer who convened the court-martial.. Even though the com-
manding officer does not have the authority to increase the severity of
the sentence, nor may she change a finding of not guilty to a finding of
guilty, she is free to reduce a sentence and to reverse a finding of
guilty. 63
In addition to the tools available to the Commander in Chief and his
military subordinates under the U.C.M.J. to govern and regulate troops,
there are a multitude of administrative devices available to accomplish
many of the same ends. These include administrative discharges, denial
of re-enlistment privileges, and career advancement delays.' 64 Soldiers
may have no recourse to the courts *hen they feel they have been
denied fair treatment in administrative decisions. In Chappell v. Wal-
lace, 65 several sailors serving on board a U.S. Navy ship brought actions
against their military superiors seeking damages, declaratory judgment,
and injunctive relief. They alleged that their constitutional rights had
been violated because of their race, in that their superiors had "failed to
assign them desirable duties, threatened them, gave them low perfor-
mance evaluations, and imposed penalties of unusual severity."166 The
Supreme Court relied on the special factors present in the relationship
that exists between a member of the armed forces and his military
superiors and held that article III courts do not have the authority to
remedy such wrongs. It noted that "the habit of immediate compliance
with military procedures and orders must be virtually reflex with no
time for debate or reflection."' 67 Therefore, the civilian courts must not
interfere with that special relationship, because it is "at the heart of the
necessarily unique structure of the Military Establishment."' 68 The Court
indicated that the Framers of the Constitution, anticipating such claims,
explicitly granted Congress plenary power "to make rules for the Gov-
ernment and regulation of the land and naval forces." 69 Based on this
grant of authority, the Court reasoned that Congress has plenary "con-
162. 10 U.S.C. §§ 822, 823, and 824 (1988).
163. The authority to reduce or vacate the findings or sentence of a court-martial "is a
matter of command prerogative involving the sole discretion of the convening
authority." 10 U.S.C. § 860(c)(1) (1988).
164. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 6012 (1990). See generally United States v. Eliason, 41 U.S.
291, 301-02 (1842) (the President's control over the military is unquestioned).
165. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
166. Id. at 297.
167. Id. at 300.
168. Id.
169. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14.
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trol over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the
Military Establishment, including regulations, procedures, and remedies
related to military discipline ... "170 The Court further concluded that
the judicial system is incompetent to deal with such sensitive matters
and that military personnel may avail themselves of the procedures and
remedies created by Congress in Art. 138 of the U.C.M.J. 17' In addition,
the Board for Correction of Naval Records provides that the aggrieved
military member "may correct any military record . . .when [the Sec-
retary of the Navy acting through the Board] considers it necessary to
correct an error or remove an injustice." 172 The Board's decision is also
subject to judicial review to determine whether the decision is arbitrary,
capricious, or was not based on substantial evidence. The Court was
concerned about the disruption in the relationship between the military
personnel and their superiors if they were allowed to sue their superiors
in court.
THE THREAT TO INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS UNDER THE CURRENT
MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM
In addition to the denial of the full array of constitutional protections
in the criminal process, soldiers are also subject to judicially sanctioned
physical and psychological abuse and neglect at the hands of their mil-
itary superiors without recourse to the civilian courts. This is based
primarily on a decision interpreting the Federal Torts Claim Act.173 In
Feres v. United States,7 4 the Supreme Court held that Congress had not
intended to allow soldiers to sue the government, or their military su-
periors, for the admittedly negligent conduct of their commanding offi-
cers. 175 This decision has been extended to cover the knowing
administration of hallucinogenic drugs to soldiers during government
experimentation. 76 Likewise soldiers who are ordered to expose them-
selves to hazardous levels of radiation are without judicial recourse.'77
This line of cases was reinforced during the same term that the Solorio
decision was rendered. 78 More recently, a district court relied on these
cases when it ruled that it was without authority to prevent the military
from administering untested drugs to soldiers during Operation Desert
Storm. 79
170. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 301.
171. A soldier "who believes himself wronged by his commanding officer, and who,
upon due application to that commanding officer, is refused redress, may complain
to any superior commissioned officer. . . . The officer exercising general court-
martial jurisdiction shall examine into the complaint and take proper measures for
redressing the wrong complained of .... ." 10 U.S.C. § 938 (1988).
172. 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a) (1988).
173. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-72, 2674-80. (1990).
174. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
175. Id. at 146.
176. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
177. Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1983).
178. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987).
179. "[U]sing unapproved drugs to protect troops facing possible exposure to chemical
and biological weapons is not research on involuntary human subjects within the
meaning of... the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1985.... [Ulsing
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As a result of the Supreme Court's action in this area, we are now
faced with a system which has the potential to involuntarily induct
young men into the military 180 where, upon entrance, they would be
deprived of their constitutional rights as criminal defendants and their
civil rights as citizens. The Court has given Congress and the executive
branch carte blanche to set qualifications based on gender,'8 ' sexual ori-
entation, 8 2 or religious beliefsim in determining who among our citizens
shall be allowed or forced to enter the armed forces. In our history, of
course, white military commanders and politicians have also determined
that African-Americans were unfit for military service.'8 4
The inequities of our past methods of drafting citizens are numerous.
During the Civil War a person who was called up in the draft could pay
a bounty and be relieved of military service. 1' During the war in In-
dochina, Americans who were fortunate enough to be accepted by a
college, and who could afford to pay the required tuition or, who pro-
fessed a desire for religious training, could avoid the draft. On the other
hand, young men who were not from affluent families, who could not
get a position in their state national guard, and who chose not to leave
the country because of a sense of patriotism, were drafted. 186 In the
the unapproved drugs to protect the troops advances legitimate government inter-
ests .... ." Doe v. Sullivan, 59 U.S.L.W. 2482 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 1991).
180. There is no active military draft at this time. However, the Military Selective Service
Act provides the mechanism for reinstating the draft on short notice. 50 App.
U.S.C. § 460(h) (1988).
181. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
182. The military services can refuse to enlist an applicant who has declared a sexual
orientation that is homosexual, without any evidence of homosexual conduct by
the applicant. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, Ben-
Shalom v. Stone, 110 S.Ct. 1296 (1990). But cf. Watkins v. United States Army, 875
F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, United States Army v. Watkins, 111 S.Ct. 384
(1990), (the Army is estopped from denying reenlistment to an individual who,
although admitting his homosexuality during 20 years of military service, was
repeatedly permitted to reenlist.)
183. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
184. In the original militias of colonial America every available man-white or black,
freedman or slave-was to help defend the domestic order against Indian
uprisings, European transgressors, and other threats to peace. However, co-
lonial leaders soon realized that domestic order was constantly threatened by
the possibility of slave revolts. Persuaded by the fear that free black militiamen
might support such insurrections and a related apprehension about training
slaves in the use of arms, the American colonies developed a policy of excluding
blacks from military service.
MARTIN BINxUN, MARK EITELBERG, ALVIN SCHEXNIDER & MARVIN SMITH, BLACKS
AND THE MILITARY, 11 (1982).
185. An Act for Enrolling and Calling Out the National Forces, and For Other Purposes,
37th Congress, Sess. III, Chap. LXXV, § 13 (March 3, 1863). See also EUGENE C.
MURDocx, PATRIOTISM LIMITED 1862-1865: THE CIVIL WAR DRAFT AND THE BouNTY
SYSTEM, Appendix B, 211 (1967).
186. Unquestionably, certain elements of society made greater sacrifices than others
during the war. A Harvard graduating class sent two of its inembers to
Vietnam out of some 1,500 draft age males, while a working-class part of
Boston with a total population of 35,000 of all ages and both sexes, lost twenty-
five of its sons killed in action. Deferments were available to those able to
enroll in colleges or professional schools, join the National Guard or reserve,
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early years of the conflict in Indochina prior to public outcry, the casualty
rates were highest among soldiers who were from impoverished back-
grounds or whose skins were darker than their comrades.
Even though we now have an "all volunteer" army, it is clear from
the advertising campaigns conducted by the Department of Defense that
the military is targeting a certain socio-economic level by focusing their
attention on the financial and economic benefits of serving in the armed
forces. This campaign has escalated while other methods of financing
a higher education are quickly vanishing. In fact, in order to be eligible
to gain many educational benefits, young men must prove that they
have registered with the Selective Service System.187 The concern that
our military forces are disproportionately populated by minorities and
the less affluent in our society was again brought to the forefront of
public debate during the deployment of U.S. armed forces to the Persian
Gulf in August, 1990, when the father of a marine facing deployment
wrote a letter to the President and observed that:
[n]one of the young men [ordered to the middle east with my
son]... are likely to be invited to serve on the board of directors
of a savings and loan association, as your son Neil [Bush] was.
And none of them have parents well enough connected to call
or write a general to insure that their child stays out of harm's
way, as Vice President Quayle's parents did for him during the
Vietnam War.I o8
It is true that the U.C.M.J. has many more procedural protections
than the original American Articles of War. However, in light of the
history of this nation's military system over the past 215 years, one must
seriously question whether America has progressed any further than
or take advantage of courses in dodging the draft offered by groups opposed
to the war. Furthermore, draft boards applied standards of their own, reflect-
ing the views of those who exercised political or economic power within a
community. In the year 1967, ominously for blacks, 98.5 percent of the 17,123
persons serving on local draft boards were white, and not a single black person
served on any of these groups in Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, or Mississippi.
In the next three years, selective service officials made an effort to improve the
racial balance of the local boards, but despite the attempt the proportion of
blacks fell short of 7 percent.
BERNARD C. NALTY, STRENGTH FOR THE FIGHT: A HISTORY OF BLAcK AMERICANS IN
THE MILITARY, 298 (1986).
187. "An individual ... who.., is or was required to register under section 3 of the
Military Selective Service Act; and ... is not so registered ... shall be ineligible
for appointment to a position in an Executive agency." 5 U.S.C. § 3328 (1988)(citation omitted). "The Secretary [of Labor] shall insure that each individual par-
ticipating in any program ... or receiving any assistance or benefit ... [from the
Department of Labor] has not violated section 3 of the Military Selective Service
Act by not presenting and submitting to registration as required by such section."
29 U.S.C. § 1504 (1988) (citation omitted). "A student applicant must certify on the
application [for an educational loan] that if required under section 3 of the Military
Selective Service Act to present himself for and submit to registration under such
section, he has presented himself and submitted to registration under such section."
42 C.F.R. § 60.7 (1990).
188. Alex Molnar, If My Marine Son Is Killed.... N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1990, at 23, col.
2.
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King Gustavus Adolphus when he instituted military codes to control
the rabble among his armies and to reinforce the privileges of the high
ranking officers who, in civil life, were the nobility of his time.
The impact of the Solorio decision is readily apparent when one
considers Justice Marshall's reasonable extension of the decision to other
areas of government action. 8 9 Imagine that two people are engaged in
the manufacture of military supplies as partners. One partner is a full
time employee of the Internal Revenue Service and the other is serving
on active duty in the armed forces. Further suppose that they knowingly
sell defective equipment to the military and fail to accurately report their
income on their tax returns. After the Court's decision in Solorio, the
soldier-partner could be tried by court-martial for both defrauding the
military and income tax evasion. On the other hand, it is inconceivable
that Congress has the power under the sixteenth amendment' 90 to set
up a criminal court system, outside of article Il courts, to hear the cases
of Internal Revenue Service employees accused of violating the criminal
law. Nor does Congress have the power to institute special criminal
courts, without petit juries, for the trial of letter carriers, patent attor-
neys, or interstate truck drivers. Yet the Court in Solorio bases its ruling
on the same plenary power granted Congress to establish a postal sys-
tem, protect intellectual property, and regulate interstate commerce as
to make rules for discipline of the armed forces. 191 The difficulty in
applying the plain language of the Constitution seems to be the Court's
interpretation of that same language in different settings. For example,
Justice Scalia once observed that "[h]ad the power to make rules for the
military not been spelled out, it would in any event have been provided
by the Necessary and Proper Clause, as is, for example, the power to
make rules for the government and regulation of the Postal Service." 92
However, it is hard to see any member of the Court upholding a criminal
prosecution of a letter carrier or postal clerk in a special Postal Service
Court.
189. Unless Congress acts to avoid the consequences of this case, every member of
our Armed Forces, whose active duty members number in the millions, can
now be subjected to court-martial jurisdiction-without grand jury indictment
or trial by jury-for any offense, from tax fraud to passing a bad check, regard-
less of its lack of relation to "military discipline, morale and fitness."
Solorio, 483 U.S. 435, 467 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
190. "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without
regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
191. The constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate the Armed Forces,
Art. I, § 8, d. 14, appears in the same section as do the provisions granting
Congress authority, inter alia, to regulate commerce among the several States,
to coin money, and to declare war. On its face there is no indication that the
grant of power in Clause 14 was any less plenary than the grants of other
authority to Congress in the same section. Whatever doubts there might be
about the extent of Congress' power under Clause 14 to make rules for the
"Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," that power surely
embraces the authority to regulate the. conduct of persons who are actually
members of the armed services.
Solorio, 483 U.S. at 441.
192. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 682 n.5 (citation omitted).
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It would also seem fundamentally unfair to give the government a
method of avoiding the mandate of the Bill of Rights by choosing which
forum it will use to prosecute a criminal case, article III courts or courts-
martial. However, in recent years the government has chosen, on at
least one occasion, to prosecute an active-duty member of the military,
who was charged with espionage against the United States arising out
of his duties in the military, in federal district court.193 In another case,
it has chosen to prosecute a retired member of the military, who was
charged with espionage activities against the United States arising out
of his duties as a civilian government employee, in a court-martial.'
These disparities exist despite the existence of an agreement between
the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense which sup-
posedily restricts such abuses of discretion. 195
The deliberative processes involved in the adjudication of criminal
guilt or innocence often appear to be burdensome luxuries to those who
rule or control non-democratic institutions. Indeed, even in our own
civilian society the ideals which form the very bedrock of our system of
individual protections are often referred to with derision as "legal tech-
nicalities." These technicalities, however, are among the principles that
every member of the armed forces has sworn to uphold, protect, and
defend, possibly with her life. While the U.C.M.J. certainly provides
more procedural safeguards than the Articles of War, the Court's ruling
on court-martial jurisdiction in Solorio is not premised on the continued
vitality of the Code.
Although the Supreme Court has held that Congress' authority is
plenary in regulating immigration, 196 once illegal aliens arrive in this
country, they are accorded greater rights than military personnel. 197 The
Court has recognized that "once an alien gains admission to our country
and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence his
constitutional status changes accordingly." 98 For even a non-citizen,
who has illegally gained entry into this country, can properly claim the
protection of the Bill of Rights in any criminal prosecution. 199 This would
193. United States v. Michael L. Walker, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1986, at 20, col. 1 (D.Md.
Nov. 6, 1986).
194. United States v. Allen, 31 M.J. 572 (N.M.C.M.R. 1990).
195. M.C.M., supra note 117, at App. IlI.
196. "The power of the government to exclude foreigners from the country whenever,
in its judgment, the public interests require such exclusion, has been asserted in
repeated instances, and never denied by the executive or legislative departments."
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
197. That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative
department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do
not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent
is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence.
If it could not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control
of another power.
Id. at 603.
198. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
199. The fourth amendment's "applicability is not limited to domestic vessels or to our
citizens; once we subject foreign vessels or aliens to criminal prosecution, they are
entitled to the equal protection of all our laws, including the Fourth Amendment."
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seem to undermine any attempt by Congress to reward non-citizens for
service in the United States military by accelerating their path to citizen-
ship.200
THE CURRENT SCOPE OF COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION POSES
DANGERS TO OUR FORM OF GOVERNMENT
The Supreme Court's ruling in Solorio also undermines this nation's
form of government in three significant ways: it diminishes the control
of the states over local criminal matters; it diminishes recognition of
federal laws and treaties as superior to military orders; and it upsets the
balance of power between the executive branch and the other branches
of government.
In Solorio the Supreme Court expressed a concern that civilian courts
would interfere with military operations if they were allowed to carry
out their traditional roles. 201 The Court's argument seems to be that if
state authorities are allowed to detain, try, and punish soldiers who
commit local crimes then the military will have lost the services of those
soldiers until the end of the state's investigation, trial, or punishment.
This reasoning is faulty on two counts. First, the military may choose
to discipline the soldiers with a vigor equivalent to that which would be
exercised by the state authorities. However, the soldiers still would be
of no service to the military since they would be undergoing punishment
pursuant to court-martial sentence. 20 2 On the other hand, if the military
is allowed to prevent the state from punishing soldiers who break local
laws, and it chooses to punish them in a less vigorous manner, then the
states will have the same complaint with federal authorities that the
revolutionary colonies had with George III. The colonists justified their
break with Great Britain partly due to military abuses and a denial of
the opportunity to punish the King's troops for criminal misdeeds in the
colonies. 203
United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1262 (5th Cir. 1978). But see United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S.Ct. 1056 (1990) (the Court states that the fourth amend-
ment is not implicated when law enforcement agents of the United States search
the foreign residence of a foreign national in a manner which would violate the
fourth amendment if undertaken in the United States). For insight on the approach
that the courts have taken to non-citizens and Constitutional protection, see T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONSTrrU-
TIONAL COMMENTARY 9 (1990).
200. The Immigration and Nationality Act grants certain benefits to non-citizens seeking
naturalization if they have served honorably in the Armed Forces of the United
States. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1439 and 1440 (1988) (emphasis added).
201. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447 (1987).
202. An argument could be made that by punishing the soldiers by means of a court-
martial, the military is achieving general deterrence among the rest of the troops.
However, the same general deterrence is achieved by letting it be known that the
military will not shield its personnel from the enforcement of state law.
203. The Declaration of Independence asks the world to note that the King:
has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices,
and the amount and payment of their salaries .... He has kept among us,
in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislatures.
He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil
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Finally, the Framers of the Constitution sought to prevent the full
power over the military from being vested in a single branch of govern-
ment. For this reason the states are authorized to maintain the militia
and the federal control of the military is divided between the President
and Congress. Under our current system of military discipline, convic-
tions of a court-martial are considered federal criminal convictions. If
the military is to have jurisdiction to try all crimes committed by mem-
bers of the armed forces, then the President's control of the military can
surpass that of Congress. For example, consider the events of the Iran-
Contra Affair, which came to public knowledge just months before the
Solorio decision.2 °4 It is apparent that the President's advisors, many of
whom were also active-duty and retired military officers, could have
conspired to violate a law enacted by Congress and avoided liability to
the civilian government by having jeopardy attach in court-martial pro-
ceedings. There is evidence that the military community was more
sympathetic to the position of the individuals involved in that matter.
The Judge Advocate General of the Navy advised the Secretary of the
Navy that a retired naval officer convicted of destroying public records
should not suffer the statutory loss of his office and retired pay, which
is automatic on such a conviction, because "the type of office held by a
retired naval officer is not the same as that contemplated by" the stat-
ute.2°5 However, General Counsel of the General Accounting Office, on
behalf of the Comptroller General, disagreed. He stated that "[i]n the
final analysis . . .it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that there is
serious doubt that a retired regular officer ... continues to be entitled
to retired pay" after such a conviction.20 6
CONCLUSION
The first casualty in the name of national defense should not be this
country's identity as a nation. The Supreme Court has told those who
guard its doors that they may not seek protection within. Even though
these people, who are mostly young and disproportionately poor and
people of color, are our fellow citizens, the government is permitted to
abuse them in a manner which would be unacceptable in any other
context. They are required to live under a system which severely
abridges the same Constitutional rights that they defend with their lives.
There appears to be no sound military necessity which requires
soldiers to give up their right to be tried in civilian criminal courts for
crimes which do not affect the armed forces. If the subject matter
jurisdiction of courts-martial is to remain as unlimited as the status test
Power .... [He has consented to the] quartering [of] large bodies of armed
troops among us... protecting them, by a mock Trial, from Punishment for
any Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States.
204. See, e.g., What Did They Know and When?, U.S. Nsws & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 8,
1986, at 16.
205. Memorandum from Rear Admiral E.D. Stumbaugh to the Secretary of the Navy
(June 30, 1989).
206. Letter from James F. Hinchman, General Counsel U.S. General Accounting Office,
to Lawrence L. Lamade, General Counsel, Department of the Navy (July 31, 1989).
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given by the Court in Solorio, the Congress, and the people of this nation,
should be wary of needlessly depriving justice to the guardians of free-
dom by their failure to act.
The Congress should also deny the Commander in Chief the ability
to have his military subordinates avoid the authority of civil law through
the preemptive use of courts-martial. We may not be able to imagine
our current civilian and military leaders taking advantage of this system.
However, this is a weakness available for exploitation.
To avoid the possibility of an unjust and non-democratic system, the
Supreme Court should reconsider its holding in Solorio at the earliest
opportunity. In the meantime, Congress should enact legislation limit-
ing the subject matter jurisdiction of courts-martial to matters which
directly affect the military.

